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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Cambodia's mine and ERW problem is a result of the long period of civil and regional conflicts 
that affected the country from the late 60s until 1998. Due to these conflicts, Cambodia is now 
one of the most heavily contaminated countries in the world, with more than 63,000 mine/ERW 
victims recorded since 1979. 
 
The first efforts to address Cambodia’s massive mine/ERW contamination came from the UN 
Advance Mission for Cambodia (UNAMIC), which contracted the HALO Trust in 1991-1992 to 
survey 700 km² of land in Battambang province ahead of the probable repatriation of 360,000 
Cambodian refugees based in Thailand. In March 1992, the UN Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia (UNTAC), deployed in February of that year, took over UNAMIC’s mission and 
functions, including assisting mine clearance and mine awareness activities. So in July 1992, 
UNTAC set up the Mine Clearance Training Unit (MCTU) and started to teach Cambodian 
nationals to identify, locate and destroy landmines, and to mark minefields. 
 
Meanwhile, the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) was also created in 1992, with a 
mandate to conduct mine clearance and mine risk education, including by coordination with 
international NGO operators such as Handicap International, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), 
HALO, and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), all of which started mine clearance operations in the 
northwest of the country that same year. After UNTAC’s withdrawal in August 1993, UNDP and 
UNOPS started to provide technical and financial support to CMAC through a UN Trust Fund for 
Demining in Cambodia. 
 
By the time it formally adopted its first national strategic plan in 1995, CMAC had become an 
efficient, autonomous organisation whose coordination role encouraged healthy competition 
between operators and a high level of cooperation between all organisations involved in mine 
action. Nevertheless, despite the high degree of national ownership of the mine action 
programme, CMAC’s management model—the organisation played the role of both a mine 
action centre and a mine action authority—proved to be too ‘bulky’ and unmanageable.  
Unsurprisingly, in 1999, several allegations of corruption, mismanagement and nepotism 
surfaced. As a result, a large number of CMAC managers and staff were demoted, moved to 
other positions or simply resigned. In addition, donor confidence was dramatically affected and 
most donors halted or diminished their financial support, waiting for the organisation’s reform. 
 
The 1999 crisis forced the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) to seek means of regaining 
regain the confidence of donors. This was done by engaging in a very structured and robust 
reform of CMAC, which significantly enhanced its operational capacity and productivity, and 
significantly improved the quality of its management. The organization slimmed down the 
headquarter structure with only three departments and reorganized the operations to gain in 
flexibility and responsiveness. In addition, the RGC also restructured the institutional framework 
of the entire mine action sector in Cambodia by creating the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim 
Assistance Authority (CMAA) as an entity completely separate from CMAC.  
 
The establishment of CMAA, as a both a coordinating body for all mine action activities and a 
regulator on behalf of the RGC, consolidated national ownership by giving the RGC the capacity 
to lead the mine action programme according to its priorities and strategies, and to regain 
  
donor confidence. However, despite the high level of national ownership, there are still a 
number of projects supported by different development partners, which are independently 
managed and implemented, including projects on MRE, demining, and integrated demining and 
development projects. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1953, Cambodia gained independence from France, and Prime Minister Sihanouk 
ruled for the following 15 years. In March 1970, he was deposed by Lon Nol, who went 
on to become the President of the new Khmer Republic in 1972. Despite massive 
support from the United States and a colossal bombing campaign, Phnom Penh fell to 
the communist Khmer Rouge regime in April 1975, under which an estimated 1.5 million 
Cambodians died; from execution, starvation or disease.  
  
In December 1978, Vietnam launched a full scale invasion of Cambodia and, on 1 July 
1979, took control of Phnom Penh, and installed the People's Republic of Kampuchea 
(PRK). 
 
Sihanouk then established the 'Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, 
Neutre, Pacifique et Coopératif' (FUNCINPEC) and its armed wing the 'Armée Nationale 
Sihanoukiste' (ANS).  The 'Khmer People's National Liberation Front' (KPNLF) of Son 
Sann joined forces with the Khmer Rouge and the ANS, uniting against the Vietnamese 
occupation. Despite the presence of a large Vietnamese military contingent (140,000) 
supporting Government forces, insurgent troops could not be defeated. The civil conflict 
lasted ten years, until Vietnam withdrew its military contingent in 1989. Peace efforts 
intensified until the Paris Peace Agreement was signed on 23 October 1991.  
 
The Khmer Rouge started to defect to the government in 1996, but despite this, the 
Government remained unstable due to the political rivalries between the two Prime 
Ministers.  An explosive battle erupted in the streets of Phnom Penh in July 1997, 
resulting in a large number of casualties and executions. In 1998, Pol Pot died, and the 
remaining Khmer Rouge leaders defected to the government in December. This 
indicated the end of more than 30 years of armed conflict in Cambodia. 
 
Cambodia's landmine problem is the result of the long period of civil and regional 
conflicts mentioned above, that affected the country from the late sixties until the end 
of 1998.  
 
Cambodia is one of the most heavily contaminated countries in the world: a total of 
63,704 victims of landmines1 and explosive remnants of war (ERW) were recorded 
between 1979 and June 2010, with 184 casualties recorded in 20102.  
 
Landmine victims represent 80 per cent of the total (50,306) and ERW victims 20 per 
                                                    
1
 The definitions of terms as 'mines', 'landmines', 'ERW', 'demining', 'humanitarian demining', 'clearance', 'mine 
action', 'mine action organisation', 'risk education', 'mine victim', 'victim assistance', etc.. refer to the definitions 
proposed by the International Mine Action Standards - IMAS 04.1.(Ed. 2), Amendments 1, 2, 3 & 4, 'Glossary of Terms 
and Definitions'. The term 'landmine' will generally embrace both landmines and ERW except when the distinction is 
important. 
2
 Cambodian Mine/ERW Victim Information System, August 2010.  
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cent (13,398), with 62 per cent of the casualties civilians. The number of victims has 
decreased over the years, from 4,320 in 1996 to 244 in 2009, however Cambodia still 
remains one of the most mine/ERW-affected countries in the world.  
 
The national Level One Survey (L1S) was completed in April 2002, and reported that 46 
per cent of all Cambodian villages were affected by landmines and/or ERW. 
Contamination was suspected in all of the 24 provinces and was estimated to affect 
4,544 km², or 2.5 per cent of the country landmass. The survey indicated that 20 per 
cent of all Cambodian villages reported an 'adverse' socio-economic impact, preventing 
access to housing, agriculture, pasture, water and forest resources.  
 
Most landmine accidents occur in the northwest of Cambodia, where the conflicts were 
most intense3. The most landmine-affected provinces are those located along the Thai–
Cambodian border: Battambang, Bantey Meanchey, Pailin, Oddar Meanchey and Preah 
Vihear. The border area is reportedly heavily mined (known as the 'K5 mine belt'), with 
an estimate of 2,400 landmines per kilometre along the 1,000 km borderline between 
the countries, making it of the most heavily contaminated areas in the world.  
 
Landmines, however, are not the only hazard impacting millions of Cambodians. During 
the Vietnam War, United States war planes dropped 2.75 million bombs over the 
country, mostly in the central and eastern provinces. The protracted nature of the 
Cambodian civilian conflict also left millions of ERW scattered through the country.  
 
A large part of those unexploded ordnances (UXO) still represent a lethal threat to 
neighbouring communities and people foraging in forested areas. Landmine victims 
used to largely exceed the number of ERW casualties
4
 (2,603 versus 730 in 1995), this 
trend turned around in 2001, and since then, ERW victims consistently surpass the 
number of landmine victims (133 versus 111 in 2009). 
 
Figure: Evolution of the number of Landmine and ERW victims until 2009 
 
 
                                                    
3
 See in Annex 4: The map of ERW/Mines accidents locations from January 2005 to June 2010 
4
 At the exception of 1997. 
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Despite massive efforts by all the mine action organisations that have been operating in 
the country for 18 years, Cambodian authorities reported that landmines and ERW 
continue to negatively affect the country, by
5
: 
 
 Putting pressure on Cambodia's already fragile healthcare system 
 Causing psychological trauma for communities forced to live alongside such a 
threat 
 Blocking access to potentially productive land 
 Weakening livelihood options such as raising cattle and foraging in forested 
areas 
 Restricting access to safe drinking water 
 Placing emotional and financial hardship on families caring for mine victims 
 Preventing access to infrastructures, services and markets 
 Diverting funds for clearance from other crucial sectors, such as education and 
health 
 Weakening Cambodia international reputation by contributing to missed 
opportunities for the country and its citizens in terms of tourism and trade 
 Increasing food insecurity 
 
                                                    
5
 National Mine Action Strategy 2010 – 2019. 
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OVERVIEW OF THE NATIONAL MINE ACTION PROGRAMME 
 
1992-1997: THE INCEPTION PHASE OF THE MINE ACTION 
PROGRAMME 
 
In November 1991, the UN Advance Mission for Cambodia (UNAMIC) was deployed to 
maintain the ceasefire during the period prior to the establishment of the UNTAC, and 
to initiate mine awareness training of civilian populations. Later, the mandate was 
enlarged to include training in mine clearance and the initiation of a mine clearance 
programme
6
. The first efforts to assess the scope of the landmine problem in Cambodia 
were conducted by the UNHCR, which had contracted The HALO Trust (HALO) in 1991-
1992 to survey 700 km² of land in Battambang province, in prevision of the repatriation 
of the 360,000 Cambodian refugees based in Thailand
7
. The result of this survey showed 
the following: 
 
• 112 km² - 'heavily mined' 
• 280 km² - 'probably mined'  
• 308 km² - 'probably clear of mines'8  
 
 
UNAMIC’s mission and functions were taken over by UNTAC in March 1992. 
Consequently, one of the four responsibilities of the UNTAC military component 
consisted in assisting mine clearance and awareness activities. In July 1992, UNTAC set 
up the mine clearance training unit (MCTU), which started to teach Cambodian 
nationals to identify, locate and destroy landmines, and to mark minefields. MCTU also 
promoted mine awareness among the general public
9
.  
 
However, MCTU activities were undermined by the absence of a general strategy that 
would have prepared for the continuation of mine action activities after the 
organisation's departure. In addition, no arrangements were made to develop the 
                                                    
6
 The United Nations Security Council Resolution 728 was adopted 8/1/1992. After recalling resolutions 668 (1990), 
717 (1991) and 718 (1991), the Council welcomed the implementation by all parties of the agreement in Paris on 
October 23, 1991, but expressed concern at the existence of landmines in Cambodia. The Council noted the 
establishment of a mine-awareness programme by a report of the Secretary-General in Resolution 717, and that the 
agreements allow the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia to assist in the process of demining and to 
undertake training programmes. It also requested the Supreme National Council of Cambodia to co-operate with the 
United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia with its expanded mandate of demining and training the local 
population, and again called upon all parties to observe the ceasefire. 
7
 A majority of the Cambodian refugees intended to resettle in Battambang province as well as in other mine-affected 
areas in the northwest of the country. 
8
 Cambodia Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Extension Request, August 2009. 
9
 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untacbackgr2.html 
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technical and management skills necessary to run a large mine action programme10.  
 
The Supreme National Council (SNC) decided to create the Cambodian Mine Action 
Centre (CMAC) in June 1992. The Governing Council of the organisation, composed of 
representatives from the SNC Presidency and from the office of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), met for the first time in November of 
the same year. Aware of the eventual UNTAC withdrawal, different practical solutions 
were found to make the deminers trained by MCTU operational. Handicap International 
Belgium (HIB), for example, temporarily employed MCTU graduates to field the 
country’s first deminers.  
 
Other demining operators such as HALO, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and Norwegian 
People's Aid (NPA) also started mine clearance operations in the northwest of the 
country. The French semi-official agency COFRAS-CIDEV started demining in 1993 in 
Siem Reap, and other organisations, such as the Cambodian Red Cross (CRC) and World 
Vision (WV), got involved in mine risk education (MRE). Organisations such as HI, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Veteran International (VI) 
supported the provision of rehabilitation services to mine victims and people with 
disabilities.   
 
After UNTAC withdrew in August 1993, UNDP began providing technical support to 
CMAC, a UN trust fund for Demining in Cambodia. The UN Security Council (UNSC) 
requested the use of its resources to assist CMAC. The first UNDP/UNOPS project for 
financial and technical assistance began at the end of 1993 ('Assistance to Demining 
Programmes - CMB/93/A07').  
 
CMAC became an autonomous public institution in 1995, with the mandate to conduct 
mine clearance and MRE operations; that year, the organisation developed its first 
strategic plan11. In late 1996, CMAC took responsibility for accrediting new mine action 
agencies and started to request 'independent' mine action operators to submit their 
workplans to reinforce coordination
12
.  
 
In 1997, the general perception about the organisation was very positive13; CMAC’s 
coordination role was strongly established and the relationship with other mine action 
organisations was based on trust and mutual respect14. Competition between 
'independent' operators and CMAC was considered healthy and a high degree of 
                                                    
10
 Eaton R., Horwood C., Niland N., 'Cambodia: The Development of Indigenous Mine Action Capacity', United Nations 
Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 1998. 
11
 CMAC, 'Clearing the Path Ahead: 1996-2000'.  
12
 GICHD, 'A Study of Capacity Development in Mine Action, Case study of Cambodia', Paterson T. with Vanna M., 
September 2004. 
13
 'CMAC enjoyed international confidence and funding from many donor countries for its operations and had 
become one of the world's most successful mine action programme by 1997', UNDP, Mine Action project CMB98006, 
Terminal Evaluation Mission 2001, Dalton M., Bou Puthy, Ayrine Uk, David Edwards. 
14
 Eaton et al, Cambodia, 1998 
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cooperation and unity among the different organisations was reported.  
 
1998-2000: A TURNING POINT – “WHAT DOES KILL YOU MAKES YOU 
STRONG”
 15
 
 
Rather than separating the regulation, coordination and implementation roles, CMAC 
became the largest mine action operator in Cambodia, playing the role of a mine action 
centre, with the organisation’s governing council acting as a mine action authority. In 
addition, CMAC represented Cambodia in the international mine action fora.  
 
At the beginning of 1999, several disturbing issues surfaced and were widely reported in 
the media. It first appeared that CMAC had to bribe officials from the Ministry of 
Economy and Finances to receive the Royal Government of Cambodia’s (RGC) financial 
contribution to the programme. It also emerged that CMAC was unable to account for 
large areas of land supposedly cleared: a May 1999 internal memorandum concluded 
that 'CMAC did not know with any clarity, completeness or accuracy in which minefields 
it conducted operations in 1998'.  Instead of clearing land for the poor, some of the 
cleared land was 'sold' for profit rather than handed over to provincial authorities.  
 
Following these corruption and mismanagement allegations, an audit conducted by 
KPMG concluded that 'the performance of the financial, management and operational 
activities was seriously deficient'.  In the audit report, the human resources department 
was accused of 'nepotism within CMAC', pointing to an extensive list of the relatives of 
CMAC managers who had been appointed within the organisation.  
  
Under donor pressure, CMAC Director General Sam Sotha was removed from his 
position in August and was replaced by General Khem Sophoan. A large number of 
CMAC managers and staff had been demoted, moved to other positions or had simply 
resigned. The UNDP Programme Coordinator also quit his position. Donor confidence 
was dramatically affected and most halted or slowed down their financial support and 
disbursements, waiting for the organisation to undergo a deep reform process. Many 
donors also chose to stop channelling their funding through the UNDP trust fund.  
 
The limited availability of funds meant that, by late 1999, CMAC was in a critical 
situation. The establishment of a 'regulatory body' attached to the CMAC Governing 
Council was proposed, to create a regulatory function outside the CMAC headquarters, 
in order to conform to the national legislation for the time being. Then, in early 
September 2000, the RGC announced the creation of the Cambodian Mine Action and 
Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA). The new structure appeared to be precisely in line 
                                                    
15
 A good understanding of the CMAC 'scandal' and the reasons that caused it is essential to fully apprehend the 
history of the program in Cambodia and appreciate the reforms implemented during the decade that followed. A 
timeline of the mine action programme and a more detailed description of the problems encountered by the 
organisation during this crucial period is in Annex 6 together with sources and references 
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with the best recognised international practices of separating the regulator from the 
service providers; as recommended by the International Mine Action Standards 
(IMAS)
16
. However, the decision to set up this new agency had not been discussed with 
the donors, and the appointment of Sam Sotha as Secretary General of the new 
structure was received with disappointment by development partners and mine action 
experts.  
 
CMAC sustained problems, and difficult relations with donors prompted the RGC to hold 
a national symposium on mine action in mid-November 2000. The objective of the 
meeting was to dissipate mistrust and enhance national and international partnerships 
under the principles of greater national ownership and leadership. The meeting 
provided an opportunity for the RGC to clarify the role of the newly established CMAA 
as well as the future of CMAC. The symposium contributed to the restoration of 
confidence between the RGC and the donor community, which did not wish to see 
CMAC totally collapsing. Many donors resumed their support to a downsized CMAC.  
The organisation reduced the headquarters to only three departments, and reorganised 
operations to be more flexible and responsive. A new field structure was adopted, with 
six regional demining units and one training centre. 
 
2001-2012: TOWARD INCREASED NATIONAL OWNERSHIP, 
LEADERSHIP AND DECISION-MAKING 
 
A streamlined and reformed CMAC remarkably survived this turbulent period, and 
emerged as a better managed and more productive organisation than before the crisis. 
A new, clearer mine action programme structure was in place, leading to increased 
efficiency and productivity of mine action activities, and in particular, for clearance 
operations.  
 
The results of the crisis were generally considered beneficial for Cambodia: the RGC 
took a more firm lead in conducting the programme, resulting in increased ownership 
and leadership in the sector. The modes of assistance to the CMAC and to the sector in 
general had been reviewed, resulting in a smaller but more adapted technical assistance 
component (see paragraph 3.2. on technical assistance).   
 
With the cessation of armed hostilities in the country, and following the Mine Ban 
Treaty (MBT) ratification, national authorities recognised the need to shift from an 
emergency approach to a longer term development perspective. Consequently, this 
generated a more precise mapping of the threat, which was essential for planning 
                                                    
16
 Following the CMAA setting up, CMAC mandate was amended with a new Royal Decree. The 1999 national 
legislation against landmines remained however unchanged. In a comment dated 12/4/2010 following a capacity 
assessment conducted in the CMAA, the organisation announced that 'the CMAA shared the findings on this aspect 
and has a firm commitment to define a clear mandate. CMAA will commission a review of the entire legal framework 
for mine action and will propose requisite legislation and amendments to realise the above commitment'
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purposes, and for measuring mine action performance.  
 
Canada and the RGC decided to launch a 'Level 1 Survey' (L1S) project, to be 
implemented by GeoSpatial International (GSI), in cooperation with CMAC. The 
objective was to document the full scope and impact of the landmine and ERW 
problem.  
 
Directly funded by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the project 
began in mid-2000 and finished in April 2002. Survey teams visited the 13,910 
Cambodian villages17, and reported that 6,416 of them (46.1 per cent) were affected by 
landmines and/or ERW18. The survey also found that 4,544 km² of land was suspected to 
be affected. The RGC considered the L1S suspected hazardous areas (SHA) to present 
the first national overview of the extent and location of Cambodia's mine and ERW 
contamination. The survey was certified by the UN certification committee, and was 
overseen by an external quality assurance monitor (QAM)
19
. 
 
Since completion of the project in 2002, and with subsequent experience gained by 
operators, the L1S results are no longer considered accurate,20 and the RGC and CMAA 
decided to implement a baseline survey (BLS) to provide more detailed information on 
the exact extent of the remaining contamination in Cambodia (see paragraph 2.3.7. on 
Survey and Area Reduction Policy).  
 
Despite symbolising Cambodian ownership in the mine action sector21, the CMAA’s 
early years were difficult, as donors provided only modest support to the organisation, 
partly because of their distrust of the Secretary-General. In addition, the RGC never met 
its annual funding commitment to the new agency22. As a result, essential functions 
were not adequately executed, such as: 
 
• overall coordination and control 
• strategic planning  
• information management  
• quality management  
 
A joint evaluation conducted in 2004 for the donor working group on mine action 
                                                    
17
 Except three of them 
18
 See in Annex 4: Map of the L1S hazards 
19
 Cambodia National Level One Survey, Final Report, GeoSpatial International Inc, 2002 
20
 The L1S follows the principles of the standard landmines impact survey (LIS) methodology developed by the Survey 
Action Centre (SAC) The purpose of the L1S was mostly to document the negative impact of landmines and ERW 
contamination on affected communities and not to determine with precision the size of those hazards neither to 
define the shape of the SHA (polygons)  
21
 'The CMAA was established to provide holistic national leadership to the sector and to symbolize Cambodia 
ownership of the problem that had up until then been largely managed by international community'. Article 5 
extension request 
22
 Paterson and Vanna, 2004 
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concluded that the CMAA was 'weak and ineffective'23. The report confirmed the lack of 
confidence in the organisation’s Secretary-General and, as result, CMAA work was 
largely ignored. Another study on capacity development noted that CMAA 
performances had been lacking in enthusiasm24.  
 
Of a mine action centre’s responsibilities, coordination is one of the easiest and 
cheapest, but nonetheless, the CMAA did not deliver satisfactory results in this function.  
 
For example, the CMAA took over the organisation of monthly coordination meetings 
that had been previously hosted by the governing council25, and which involved all 
stakeholders and even donors.  However, meetings were not regularly organised, were 
called with minimal notice, and provided little opportunity for open discussion. The view 
expressed by the operators was that these coordination meetings were for the most 
part, worthless. Coordination meetings with donors through the Mine Action Advisory 
Board (MAAB), replacing the former CMAC Steering Committee, also took place 
infrequently26. 
 
However, despite existing difficulties, and thanks to external assistance from several 
donors and development organisations, the CMAA gradually became more operational 
and produced a national mine action strategy, and, in August 2003, finalised a five-year 
mine action plan. The Land Use Planning Units (LUPU) system was preserved and even 
enlarged to new provinces (see paragraph 2.2. on planning). 
 
In parallel, with the adoption of the Millennium Declaration in 2000, international 
attention increasingly focused on the importance of both aid volume and effectiveness. 
In December 2004, the RGC issued a formal declaration on 'development cooperation 
partnerships to enhance aid-effectiveness' and the mine action sector adopted the 
coordination and harmonisation mechanisms developed by the RGC; the Cambodian 
Rehabilitation Development Board (CRDB) and the Council for Development of 
Cambodia (CDC).  
 
In October 2008, a new Royal Decree27 was issued, and Sam Sotha was replaced as 
CMAA Secretary General and Ambassador in charge of landmine issues a few weeks 
later, by Chum Bun Rong.
28
   
                                                    
23
 Griffin R., Keeley R., Joint Evaluation of Mine Action in Cambodia for the Donor Working Group on Mine Action, 
December 2004  
24
 Paterson and Vanna, 2004.  Participants to those meetings reported that they constituted a 'one way 
communication' from the CMAA Secretary-General rather than an opportunity for open discussions  
25
 The meetings were called the 'Cambodian Demining Coordination Committee' (CDCC) 
26
 Paterson and Vanna, 2004   
27
 Royal Decree 1008/1133 dated 20/10/2008. The inter-ministerial character of the authority has been modified and 
the new CMAA was mostly composed of CMAA technicians. The Prime Minister remains the Chair and Minister Prak 
Sokhon becomes Vice-President instead of Minister Sok An   
28
 The removal was presented as a normal rotation of personnel. See 'Demining Head loses two posts in reshuffle', 
Phnom Penh Post, 30/12/2008. However, it is believed that the reshuffle was rather linked to the sensitive border 
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The UNDP projects 'Assistance to Mine Action in Cambodia' (2001-2005) and 'Clearing 
for Results 2006-2010' (C4R) assisted CMAA to achieve a number of critical advances in 
national planning, prioritisation and mine action regulation. An evaluation of the C4R 
project in 2009 concluded that: 
 
• the project had been pivotal in consolidating the institutional and operational 
functioning of the CMAA 
• considerable progress in the targeting and application of mine action assets and 
with the systematisation of surveys and land release approaches had been made 
• quality assurance and socio-economic impact improved 
• CMAA possessed the fundamental political authority and technical competences 
to manage its mandate more ably and maturely29  
 
Recently, the CMAA successfully prepared the Cambodian MBT Article 5 Extension 
Request and a ten-year extension has been granted to give Cambodia a new deadline 
(December 2019), to comply with the treaty Article 5 obligation to clear all anti-
personnel mines. To guide mine action operations during these ten years, Cambodia 
developed a new Mine Action Strategy 2010-2019 (NMAS), which includes landmine 
and ERW clearance, and MRE and victim assistance activities. The strategy was 
developed under the leadership of the CMAA in a consultative and inclusive process 
with all stakeholders.  
 
It is estimated that, with the current level of support, and if operational productivity 
continues to increase, the landmine and ERW threat will be reduced to a negligible level 
in the next ten years30, and its impact on affected communities will be minimal. In the 
long term, police and military capacity should be developed to address this residual 
threat.  
 
To demonstrate increased ownership in the sector, Cambodia and the CMAA organised 
for the 11th Meeting of States Parties (MSP) to the Mine Ban Treaty to take place in 
Phnom Penh from 28 November to 2 December 201131. A side event was held as part of 
the Phnom Penh MSP, to present the significant achievements of the mine action sector 
in Cambodia in the previous fifteen years, including the solid policy and institutional 
                                                                                                                                                           
issues with Thailand. Visited in his office at the Council of Ministers, M. Sam Sotha declared that he had now new 
responsibilities and had 'erased all his computers and brain hard disks concerning mine action', interview with Sam 
Sotha, Phnom Penh, 31/8/2010 
29
 Powell B., Review of 'Clearing for Results', A partnership for Landmine Action in Cambodia, UNDP Cambodia (2006-
2010), Final Draft, December 2009 
30
 The national mine action strategy indicates that, during the next ten years, Cambodia plans to release 
approximately 470 km² of the estimated 648 km² of land considered contaminated by APM. Those figures do not take 
into account the ATM and ERW contamination 
31
 See 'Achieving the aims of the Cartagena Action Plan: the Phnom Penh Progress Report 2010-2011', Draft as of 13 
November 2011 
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framework.32  The seminar also underlined the remaining challenges, including: 
 
• the importance of improving government/donor coordination,  
• a greater alignment between development partners and the RGC through 
stronger emphasis and adherence to the partnership principles   
 
                                                    
32
 'Addressing the landmine contamination on the framework of international obligations (Article 5) and Millennium 
Development Goals (CMDG9)', Seminar Proceedings, 29/11/2011, Phnom Penh, Draft Minutes  
 12 
 
CURRENT STATUS OF THE MINE ACTION PROGRAMME 
 
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNMENT SUPPORT 
POLICY DIALOGUE AND AID EFFECTIVENESS 
Cambodia has long been synonymous with the issue of landmines, both in terms of 
impact, and the energy and innovation of the government and the international 
community in addressing the problem.  
 
Mine action has always been highly positioned in the RGC agenda. The RGC actively 
supported CMAC operations and strengthened its leadership over the sector with the 
establishment of the CMAA in 2000. Cambodia has also been very active in the 
international fora and structures against landmines. The RGC is committed to conclude 
Cambodia’s mine action story as soon as possible and in a positive way, and has tried to 
establish itself as a model for effective and sustained management of widespread 
landmine contamination.  
 
The policy dialogue with development partners used to take place during annual 
consultative groups' meetings, but recently the RGC turned this process into the 
Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum (CDCF). The first CDCF meeting was held in 
Phnom Penh in June 2007, with the government taking the lead and the ownership of 
the process. The RGC has also developed a Government - Development Partner 
Coordination Committee (GDCC) that supports the technical working groups under the 
umbrella of the Cambodian Rehabilitation and Development Board at the Council for 
the Development of Cambodia (CRDB/CDC)33.  
 
Today, the structure of the mine action sector is clearly defined34. The CMAA is 
responsible for the coordination, monitoring and regulation of all mine action activities, 
and for the formulation of strategies and plans to achieve the priorities identified by the 
RGC development policies. The CMAA has now established a number of policies, 
standards and guidelines for the management of the mine action programme, and as 
such is responsible for the implementation and monitoring of the national mine action 
strategy. 
 
Since 2004, a technical working group on mine action has brought the government and 
development partners together to discuss policy issues, with the aim of improving 
coordination, promoting alignment and harmonisation. Its mandate is to ensure the 
government's leadership in coordinating all RGC, development partners and NGO 
activities and resources, and to promote aid effectiveness according to the Cambodian 
                                                    
33
 See Annex 7: The national aid effectiveness agenda in Cambodia 
34
 National Mine Action Strategy 
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Declaration on Enhancing Aid Effectiveness and the Government Harmonisation, 
Alignment and Results (HAR) action plan.  
 
The application of the HAR action plan and of relevant joint monitoring indicators by all 
stakeholders is crucial to the successful implementation of the mine action programme 
and strategy. It requires that all development partners coordinate and align their 
contributions and design their projects and programmes in support of sectorial strategic 
goals and annual work plans. One of the most significant challenges to promote aid 
effectiveness in the mine action sector relates to information management; all 
implementing partners have to report the results of their activities to CMAA. 
Information on external assistance should be made available via the Cambodian Official 
Development Assistance database, and the CMAA.  
 
The Cambodian mine action sector is moving towards a programme-based approach35, 
as a way of managing the sector based on the principles of coordinated support. 
Programme-based approaches share the following features: 
 
 leadership by the host country or organisation 
 a single comprehensive programme and budget framework  
 a formalised process for donor coordination and harmonisation of donor 
procedures for reporting, budgeting, financial management and procurement 
 efforts to increase the use of local systems for programme design and 
implementation, financial management, monitoring and evaluation  
 
The technical working group on mine action is currently finalising the review of new 
partnership principles36 that were signed in April 2011, by the RGC and seven 
development partners (Australia, Canada, Germany, Norway, Ireland, UK and the UN), 
to reinforce partnerships and collaborations between the RGC and development 
partners in the mine action sector. 
 
In December 2011, the CMAA organised a one day training by the Geneva based 
'Gender and Mine Action Programme' (GMAP) and identified the main components of a 
future 2012 gender action plan37. In October 2011, the CMAA organised a workshop on 
gender and mine action to assess the progress and the needs. The UN gender guidelines 
were circulated on this occasion.  
 
                                                    
35
 See OECD Glossary: www.oecd.org/dac. The PAB is basically a Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) that deals with a 
thematic of a cross-cutting issue (as mine action or gender) rather than with traditional development 'sectors' as 
education or health. Donors can support and implement programme-based approaches in many different ways and 
across a range of aid modalities including budget support, sector budget support, project support, pooled 
arrangements and trust funds. There are currently 19 TWG in Cambodia, including the technical working group on 
mine action. 
36
 'Partnership Principles for the Implementation of the NMAS 2010-2019 as a single framework for mine action 
related assistance', the document should be discussed during the next TWG-MA meeting. 
37
 Email from UNDP programme advisor, 8/12/2011. 
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STRATEGIC AND DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORKS 
Cambodia ratified the Mine Ban Treaty38 in July 1999, and it entered into force on 1 
January 2000. In May 1999, Cambodia adopted a national legislation banning anti-
personnel (AP) mines39, and started to produce its annual transparency reports 
according to Article 7 of the MBT. Cambodia destroyed its stockpiles of AP mines before 
the deadline of December 2004, in conformity with Article 4 of the convention. 
Cambodia is also a state party to the Amended Protocol II on Landmines of the 
Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), but not to the CCW Protocol V on 
Explosive Remnants of War. Cambodia has also not yet signed the Convention on Cluster 
Munitions (CCM).  
 
Mine action is clearly articulated and prioritised in national development plans and 
poverty-alleviation policies. 
 
Consistent with the international aid effectiveness agenda, the National Strategic 
Development Plan (NSDP) 2006-2010 reaffirms the RGC ownership and leadership of the 
development process. The NSDP is the single, overarching document containing the 
RGC's priority goals and strategies to reduce poverty and achieve the Cambodian 
Millennium Development Goals (CMDG). The NSDP clearly underlines the humanitarian 
and security significance of mine action and reaffirms the importance of mine clearance 
for 'land distribution and the security of poor farming households in remote areas'. The 
plan indicates that demining and risk education activities will be continued to reduce 
the number of casualties40.  
 
The NSDP has been formulated using the comprehensive 'rectangular strategy'
41
 of the 
RGC. The strategy confirms that mine action will remain a government priority during 
the new legislature that started in 2008. The strategy recognised that progress in mine 
clearance was illustrated by a sharp drop in mine and ERW casualties; from 800 cases in 
2003 to 315 cases in 2007. It also specified that mine action resulted in the expansion of 
road networks and agricultural land; the strategy closely linked mine clearance to the 
'principles of equitable distribution of cleared land to landless farmers'. 
 
In 2003, the RGC adapted the eight universally agreed MDGs to better suit the realities 
of the country. Recognising that one major constraint to development is the continued 
                                                    
38
 'Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on 
their Destruction, 18 September 1997', also called the 'Ottawa Convention'. 
39
 'The Prohibition of the use of all Anti-Personnel Mine', Cambodian Law against Anti-Personnel Mines, adopted in 
May 1999. 
40
 The National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP) 2009-2013 has reset the target of the two indicators. The number 
of annual mine/ERW victims should decrease by 10% every year; from the 2008 baseline (271 victims), the figure 
should decrease to 243 in 2009, 212 in 2010, 191 in 2011, 172 in 2012 and 155 in 2013. The 2998 baseline total 
cumulative cleared areas was 47,650 ha; annual figures should increase by 2% to 52,918ha in 2009, 58,292 ha in 
2010, 63,772 ha in 2011, 69,363 ha in 2012 and 75,065 ha in 2013.  
41
'Rectangular Strategy for Growth, Employment, Equity and Efficiency Phase II', First Cabinet Meeting of the 4
th
 
Legislature of the National Assembly, September 2008. 
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contamination of landmines and ERW, the RGC added demining, UXO and victim 
assistance to the list, to be the ninth major development goal. 
 
ARTICLE 5 EXTENSION REQUEST AND NATIONAL MINE ACTION STRATEGY 
Due to the high level of contamination, Cambodia requested and secured a ten-year 
extension of the Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline42. It is believed that sustained 
funding combined with maximising land release methodologies will assist Cambodia to 
comply with its international obligations. According to latest estimations, around 650 
km² could remain mine-affected and will need to be addressed in the future.  
 
Based on the current productivity levels, Cambodia estimates that demining operations 
undertaken during the next ten years by the three humanitarian operators combined 
can achieve 470 km² and will require approximately USD 330 million of support. The 
strategy to reach this objective is articulated in the national mine action strategy 2010-
2019 successfully developed by the CMAA with all stakeholders and partners.  
 
The NMAS has been developed for a ten-year period (2010-2019), covering the ten-year 
Article 5 Extension request period, and two cycles of the NSDP (2009-2013 and 2014-
2018). The strategy aims to reach a situation where Cambodia is 'free from the impact 
of mines and ERW' and to ensure 'that women, men and children live safely and 
development can take place in a safe environment'.   
 
An essential component of the strategy begins with the implementation of a baseline 
survey, to define the remaining contamination through a new land classification system. 
The findings of this will complement the MAPU system and enhance planning and 
prioritisation, to see clearance assets deployed where the greatest needs are
43
. 
 
PLANNING CAPACITIES 
 
Cambodia gradually developed one of the most efficient and sophisticated mine action 
planning mechanisms in the world. While clearance operations primarily responded to 
humanitarian and emergency imperatives in the first years of the programme, the 
necessity to integrate socio-economic considerations in the planning system emerged 
around 1996 and 1997.  
 
CMAC started to acknowledge that it could not be responsible for the allocation of 
demined land to beneficiaries, but must hand over safe land to local authorities. CMAC 
concluded that it had to develop a stronger coordination with local authorities, 
development agencies and other entities, before deciding which land had to be cleared 
                                                    
42
 Article 5 Extension Request. 
43
 See in Annex 8: The main measures of the national mine action strategic plan. 
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and for what purpose. It became gradually recognised that demining operators should 
not decide alone which land is to be cleared. Demining is costly and time-consuming, 
and guarantees should exist to ensure that cleared land is effectively used for 
development purposes and by their intended beneficiaries44.  
 
Such a move had even become more urgent when stories about land grabbing and 
demined lands being confiscated by civilian or military officials started to emerge. CMAC 
decided to address the problem during a two day workshop in Battambang in June 
1998.  During this meeting, military and police officers, provincial and local authorities, 
UN agencies and development NGOs decided to develop together a new planning 
system that would guarantee that cleared lands would be handed over to the intended 
beneficiaries and would be protected from grabbing. The system was called land use 
planning unit (LUPU)45.  
 
With European Commission support, HI Belgium and Australian Volunteers International 
(AVI) provided training and capacity development to the system that was gradually 
enlarged to Bantey Meanchey46, Preah Vihear, Pailin and Oddar Meanchey.  
 
An evaluation of the LUPU conducted in 2003 reported that the process was positively 
evaluated by most of the senior PSC members who 'feel that it is clearly a government 
structure that plays a useful role in preventing land disputes, in identifying suitable 
beneficiaries to receive land and in bringing together demining operators and 
development agencies'47. However, the LUPU system could not be considered as a quick 
fix solution for all problems: by nature, LUPUs addressed large mine clearance tasks only 
and could not be used as a planning tool for small tasks.  
 
As the process takes several months, the system is also not ideal for emergency tasks. 
Other systems had to be used to plan for those small and/or emergency tasks, such as 
                                                    
44
 As seen in the previous chapter, the system arrived too late to protect CMAC from 'contract demining' and land 
grabbing scandals. It is somehow bad luck for CMAC as the EC TA project addressing the problem should have started 
in 1997 but was postponed to 1998 due to the July 2007 factional fighting. In addition, while the Battambang 
workshop took place in June 1998, the system could only be set up in 1999 due to the July 1998 elections and the 
subsequent establishment of a new government.  
45
 The system was first established in Battambang in 1999 and was designed to be transparent, participative, 
decentralised and community-based. The process involves mine-affected villages, communes and districts authorities, 
mine action operators and development agencies operating in the target areas. Through that mechanism, mine 
action can effectively support commune and provincial development plans. The process aims at gradually developing 
a list of demining tasks at commune and district level, in cooperation with all stakeholders, and having this workplan 
officially endorsed at the provincial level. The objectives of the system were: to ensure effective, suitable and fair 
land use, land management and allocation of land in mined areas, to ensure the demining process is clearly planned, 
fair and transparent and engages the full participation of local authorities, to reduce land conflicts through effective 
land management and well-planned demining agendas, to coordinate and facilitate all processes related to solving 
land disputes. 
46
 The system in Bantey Meanchey had first been called 'Land Use Management Unit' (LUMU) and was slightly 
different than in Battambang. The LUMU would later been aligned on the Battambang system.  
47
 Bolton M., Limpanboon P., Chhim V., Report of the external evaluation project "LUPU - Support to the planning of 
demining and the utilisation of demined land in Cambodia", October 2003. 
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the CMAC community-based mine risk reduction or the community mine marking 
teams.  
 
Another workshop organised in Battambang in December 2002 concluded that the 
LUPU initiative virtually eliminated the theft of demined land48. This can be considered 
as a remarkable outcome considering the immense difficulties that were encountered in 
the past. In his closing speech, a government representative requested to: 
 
• preserve and protect the system 
• homogenise the operating procedures of the existing LUPUs  
• find an institutional connection at the national level  
 
Not everybody was convinced at that time that the LUPU system should have been 
taken over by the CMAA. The setting up of the Ministry of Land Management, Urban 
Planning and Construction (MLMUPC), with its indisputable responsibilities on the 
national cadastre and the social concessions system (potentially including cleared 
lands), could have been an opportunity to immediately try integrating mine action 
planning in local and provincial development plans.  
 
It is likely that such a move would have been audacious, but the MLMUPC was probably 
not so keen to endorse such new responsibility at that time. Consequently, the CMAA 
soon started working on the Sub-decree N°70/ANK/BK, officially adopted by the RGC in 
October 2004. The CMAA issued guidelines on socio-economic management of mine 
clearance operations in February 2005, and the guidelines were revised in November 
200649. The policy guideline describes the roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders in 
the socio-economic management process of mine clearance operations. The operational 
guideline details all activities to be implemented during the planning process.  
 
Basically, the new Sub-decree transforms the former LUPUs into mine action planning 
units (MAPU) and the former PSC into provincial mine action committees (PMAC)50. This 
mechanism is quite similar to the former LUPU system, and tries to build on it. The 
MAPU conducts field investigations to: 
 
• identify mined areas to be cleared  
• monitor clearance activities and post clearance land use  
 
                                                    
48
 'LUPUs stop demined land theft', Phnom Penh Post, 6/12/2002. It was also documented that LUPU teams 
contributed to resolve land related disputes. 
49
 CMAA, Policy Guidelines and Operational Guidelines on Socio-Economic Management of Mine Clearance 
Operations, November 2006. 
50
 Article 5 Extension Request. The Sub-Decree preserves the 'bottom-up planning process that allows local 
communities to participate in the process of identifying suspect mined areas and to contribute to clearance 
prioritisation leading to development of Provincial clearance plans'.  
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The process starts with commune meetings where each village chief presents the village 
'wish-list' of priority-clearance sites to the commune. Village chiefs, community-based 
mine risk reduction (CBMRR), members of village development committee (VDC), 
development agencies and commune chiefs participate in the commune meeting 
facilitated by MAPU51.  
 
Mine action district working groups (MADWG) are established by the provincial 
governors in the districts where demining services are required. The composition of 
MADWG includes members from district line offices and from stakeholders involved in 
demining activities. Once minefield investigations of all proposed sites have been 
completed, the results of the commune meetings and the minefield investigations are 
presented during a district workshop, and each demining site is rated by the 
participants using criteria developed by the PMAC in accordance to the operational 
guidelines. Each minefield is categorised as 'high', 'medium' or 'low risk'. 
 
Based upon the available number of demining assets, workshop participants determine 
which sites come first for clearance, with high risk sites first on the list. Once the tasks 
lists are finalised at the district level, they are presented to the PMAC for final approval. 
The PMAC can add some of its own priorities to the final list. The MAPU then prepares a 
list of all approved tasks with the location and name of the operator. It becomes the 
responsibility of each operator to prepare its own plan for each site. Demining 
operators’ annual clearance plans are then kept by the MAPU; completed minefields 
and clearance progress are then forwarded to CMAA for inclusion in the database. 
CMAA reports that the 'success of the prioritisation processes is clearly demonstrated in 
the post-clearance land use monitored by the CMAA'
52
.  
 
In 2007 and 2008, 61 per cent of clearance tasks targeted agriculture and resettlement, 
while roads represented 28 per cent, and other purposes, such as schools, pagodas, 
health centres, dykes and risk reduction purposes represented 11 per cent.  
 
The mid-term evaluation of the project 'clearing for results' conducted in 2008
53
 
recognised that the MAPU process was conceptually sound, and that progress was 
made in its implementation. The review team concluded that the CMAA should be more 
involved in priority-setting and in the allocation of demining assets at the national level. 
However, it also highlighted MAPU system’s lack of flexibility as an issue. For example, 
once a plan was officially adopted, operators had to implement it, and were not allowed 
to carry out area reduction or cancellation. As a result, demining units were not always 
deployed according to high priorities. 
 
                                                    
51
 Idem. 
52
 Article 5 Extension Request. 
53
 UNDP, midterm evaluation of the UNDP Project: 'Clearing for Results: A Partnership for Landmine Action in 
Cambodia', Gomer L., Paterson T, Creighton M., November 2008. 
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For this reason, the review team also made several suggestions to correct these 
problems, including the adoption of an area reduction policy, which has in fact been 
adopted. MAPUs are currently operational in eight provinces, and the RGC plans to 
establish seven additional MAPU in the east and northeast of the country54. 
 
DEMINING CAPACITIES 
 
The Cambodian mine action sector achieved remarkable results from 1992 to 2009, 
thanks to a combination of all operators’ demining activities, with efforts from all 
stakeholders in the sector. In mid-2010, there was an estimated 5,000 staff employed 
by the four demining operators (CMAC, RCAF, HALO and MAG). 
 
The demining capacity of the three humanitarian civilian mine clearance operators was 
consistently assessed and considered very positive during the last period of the 
programme, and their performance on the ground was  described as good and 
improving55.  
 
The increase of productivity of the demining operators in the last ten years has also 
been impressive. The CMAA Database reported that a total of 595.5 km² was cleared by 
the four demining operators between 1992 and July 201056.  However, it must be noted 
that although RCAF does report to CMAA, CMAA does not carry out quality 
management. Since RCAF reporting does not follow usual systems (eg IMAS, IMSMA, 
etc.), CMAA simply records the information provided, but does not check or review it, 
making the quality of its reporting quite poor. In addition, RCAF reports their clearance 
numbers without any map references. This means that more than 200 km2 of clearance 
done by RCAF the CMAA database can only report in numbers not their locations. 
 
These issues notwithstanding, the three humanitarian demining operators
57
 (CMAC, 
MAG and HT) cleared altogether 385 km². The demining progress report for the three 
organisations is as follow: 
 
 CMAC MAG HT TOTAL
M² 292.386.859         30.465.883         62.090.924         384.943.666      
 
 
                                                    
54
 CMAA has aligned the mine action planning system with subnational development and investment programmes, 
especially the Commune Investment Programmes (CIP). New MAPU will be developed in seven new provinces in the 
east of the country, to focus on BAC and ERW.  
55
 Paterson and Vanna, Capacity Development, 2004. 
56
 CMAA, Demining Progress Report (1992-July 2010), statistics extracted from operators demining progress reports 
and updated as of August 9, 2010. 
57
 So far, only one RCAF demining platoon is accredited by the CMAA. The mandate and working methods of the RCAF 
demining operations are not similar to those of the three other humanitarian demining operators. 
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Since the beginning of the programme in 1992, a total of 884,000 anti-personnel mines 
and more than 20,000 anti-vehicle mines have been found and destroyed, and nearly 
two million UXO have been destroyed. Large amounts of suspected land has been 
released for productive use, including: 
 
• for the safe resettlement of thousands of refugees and internally displaced 
people (IDP)  
• to facilitate social and physical infrastructure reconstruction and other 
development activities58 
 
Productivity of demining operations has also strongly increased since the beginning of 
the programme, as 132.5 km² was cleared by all operators between 1992 and 2000, and 
a total of 462.8 km² was reported to have been cleared between 2001 and July 2010. 
For the three humanitarian demining operators, the figure increased from 96.2 km² 
(1992-2000) to 288.7 km² (2001-July 2010). 
 
CMAC 
Since its establishment, CMAC has grown into a large organisation which, by mid-1998, 
employed nearly 3,000 staff. The current number of staff is 2,300, 95 per cent of whom 
are deployed in the field. The four core functions of the organisation are MRE, 
information, clearance and training. The largest component of the staff remains 
employed in the demining platoons.  
 
CMAC continues to innovate in introducing new demining tools and new approaches 
and methodologies to increase the productivity of the organisation and deal efficiently 
with the threat. The organisation demining toolbox includes, among others:  
 
• demining platoons 
• mine detection dogs (MDD) 
• demining machines 
• brush cutters 
• EOD teams 
• battle area clearance (BAC) teams 
• technical survey teams  
• CBMRR teams 
 
CMAC clearance capacity is mainly deployed to support humanitarian and development 
priorities, as determined by the MAPU, and to respond to risk-reduction requests from 
highly-affected communities59. 
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During the 18 years of operation, extensive capacities have been developed within the 
organisation to allow CMAC take full ownership as a national demining organisation. 
Since its inception, CMAC reports to have cleared more than 292 km² and destroyed 
nearly 450,000 landmines and more than 1.5 million UXO. 
 
THE HALO TRUST 
HALO started working in Cambodia in 1991, when it was contracted by UNHCR to 
undertake a rapid survey to facilitate the safe repatriation of Cambodian refugees from 
Thailand. HALO began formal mine clearance operations in 1992 and has concentrated 
on the northwest provinces. HALO’s objectives are to return land to poor communities 
for farming and settlement and to reduce casualties caused by mines/UXO. The 
organisation concentrated mainly on demining, and prides itself on the safety and the 
efficiency of its clearance operations.  
 
HALO introduced a number of innovations intended to boost productivity, such as the 
'one man-one lane' (OMOL) drill for clearance. In 2003, the organisation developed a 
dedicated EOD team and a MRE team. Following CMAC crisis, the organisation’s 
operational capacity increased from 561 staff in 1999 to 900 in 2001. Its current 
capacity is 1,161 national staff and four international staff60. 
 
MINE ADVISORY GROUP (MAG) 
MAG started working in Cambodia in 1992 and has carried out humanitarian mine 
action operations in landmine- and ERW-affected communities since then, with a focus 
on clearance, community liaison and MRE.  
 
MAG has built partnerships with development organisations to systematically integrate 
humanitarian mine action with development activities, especially in support of rural 
development. MAG currently works in the provinces of Battambang, Bantey Meanchey, 
Kampong Cham, Pailin and Stung Treng, with a capacity of approximately 250 national 
and five international staff61. MAG’s strategic objective in Cambodia is to mitigate the 
effects that remnants of conflict have on livelihoods, health, and economic and social 
development, which will in turn promote poverty alleviation.  
 
MAG has developed innovative approaches, with the introduction of both the 
community liaison concept, which has been widely used. The organisation has also 
promoted the hiring of women and amputees to work as deminers. 
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THE ROYAL CAMBODIA ARMED FORCES 
The RCAF engineering brigades have been involved in demining for many years. The RGC 
has defined the roles of the RCAF in mine action as: 
 
• urgent demining in support of government priority projects, and  
• demining in support of UN Peacekeeping Operations62 
 
RCAF demining capacity is about 1,300 personnel; they have received equipment and 
training from China, France, Japan and the United States. RCAF is a national institution 
with significant assets in the country, and is reported to have cleared 210.5 km² 
between 1993 and July 2010. This represents more than 50 per cent of the three other 
civilian operators’ achievements.  
 
However, much of the reported clearance has been combined survey and clearance of 
roads in support to rehabilitation projects. It was noted that higher productivity is 
normal for such tasks, as most of the considered areas are actually not contaminated63. 
 
Because of its specific mandate and command and control structure, RCAF does not 
plan its work through CMAA and the MAPU system, and is not fully under the direction 
of the CMAA. RCAF activities have not been subject to CMAA quality assurance, so some 
other mine action organisations or development partners express concern that the 
areas cleared by RCAF units may not be truly safe for civilian use. One RCAF demining 
platoon was accredited in 2010; CMAA plans to accredit additional units in the future.  
 
As indicated in the mine action strategy, the RGC foresees that RCAF may be an 
important contributor in the long term solution to the residual contamination, once the 
current programme structure with the civilian demining agencies will have disappeared. 
It remains to be seen how the CMAA and RCAF will strengthen their operational 
coordination and reporting system in the future.  
 
 
OTHER NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS (NGOS) AND PRIVATE 
COMPANIES 
NGOs, such as Handicap International (HI) and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) have been 
directly involved since the beginning of demining operations in the country. HI was used 
in 1992 as an employment mechanism for deminers trained by the MCTU, before 
handing those demining platoons over to CMAC.  
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CMAA database.  
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NPA started clearance projects in Battambang and Bantey Meanchey in support of the 
Cambodian refugees’ repatriation operations carried out by UNHCR, and the 
resettlement projects managed by the organisation. NPA handed this demining capacity 
over to CMAC, and concentrated on providing technical assistance to CMAC.  
 
The French organisation COFRAS/CIDEV developed demining activities in the Siem Reap 
province, before their activities were integrated in CMAC DU6. Private companies also 
entered the demining sector in Cambodia. Chirgwin Services Group was contracted with 
Australian funds to clear land around an orphanage. UXB International was contracted 
by the US State Department to monitor the US funded activities carried out by CMAC 
DU3 in Pailin. Two local companies, MUA and Technical Assistance to Demining Service 
(TADS) won contracts for survey and clearance services in support of road rehabilitation 
projects funded by ADB.  
 
It is also worthwhile mentioning that some development agencies integrated 
development and clearance activities aimed at improving livelihood conditions for local 
communities living in or near landmines/ERW contaminated areas64. 
 
VILLAGE DEMINING 
In Cambodia, access to safe land that is suitable for cultivation has been, and continues 
to be, a widespread problem. Therefore, poor villagers developed what is called 'village 
demining' activities. Mine clearance was undertaken by many people in Cambodia’s 
rural areas, and the phenomenon was considered very significant but also very 
controversial in the mine action community.  
 
It was demonstrated that village mine clearance activities were usually 'rational 
activities driven by livelihood needs'65. Village deminers recognise that what they do is a 
dangerous activity but they also affirm that they do not have the choice, as landmines 
block access to food and other essential resources.  
 
Some mine action professionals have made proposals to make use of village deminers, 
or to provide technical support or equipment to them. These proposals were generally 
rejected because of concerns in term of safety, risk, responsibility and liability. It was 
however widely recognised that the level of assistance provided by the sector remained 
considerably low compared with the need.  
 
It is not possible to precisely assess the village demining activities outputs. However, 
information obtained from CMAC and reported by the 1999 Landmine Monitor Report 
indicates that village deminers had cleared an estimated nearly 80 per cent of the 
surfaces cleared by professional operators. Figures reported in 2000 were lower, at 45 
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per cent, but indicate without any doubt that village mine clearance activities were 
happening on a large scale throughout Cambodia, prior to and despite the arrival of 
professional mine action organisations
66
.  
 
SURVEY AND AREA REDUCTION POLICY 
Several surveys were implemented and carried out by different organisations in 
Cambodia, to try to identify suspect or confirmed contaminated areas. However, no 
single consistent uniform set of procedures have been followed over time by the 
different operators. As a result, data was collected in different ways, areas were 
classified in different categories, and surveys were designed for different purposes. As a 
result, the CMAA national database now contains six different types of survey reports67. 
 
It is considered that some categories of these reports do not precisely describe the 
current location and extent of Cambodia’s contamination; in particular the L1S reports 
and this survey had been designed to measure the impact on affected communities 
rather than accurately map mined areas. As a result, the national database operated by 
CMAA in cooperation with NPA, CMAC, HT, MAG and CMVIS contains conflicting 
information:  
 
• overlapping areas 
• conflicting classifications 
• poor definition of area boundaries  
 
Also, many areas that are effectively still contaminated have been missed. The lack of 
uniformed procedures, and the problem caused by this situation on the operational 
planning has been recognised by all operators and the government. 
 
Because of the L1S limitations and the existence of conflicting information, the CMAA 
and the three humanitarian demining operators decided to carry out a more focused 
and detailed survey, to identify and define the exact extent of the remaining mined and 
suspected areas.  
 
The baseline survey started in August 2009 and was carried out by CMAC, HALO and 
MAG in 122 districts. The operation began in the 21 most mine-affected districts that 
represent 93 per cent of mine accidents that happened between 2004 and 2008, and 
are considered to represent the most important priority for demining operators.  
 
The information collected by the baseline survey is to supersede all previously-recorded 
suspected hazardous areas; it will therefore provide a fresh and up-to-date picture of 
the contamination. This is especially important because. This information belongs to 
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CMAA and will be shared with MAPU, commune councils and village chiefs, and will 
document future demining operations as regards planning and prioritisation. In fact, 
only areas covered by the baseline survey will be accepted for survey and clearance 
operations based on the MAPU prioritising and selection process, so MAPU will 
gradually update the baseline survey information with completion tasks and released 
land.  
 
NATIONAL MINE ACTION STANDARDS AND QUALITY MANAGEMENT 
 
Since 1992, mine clearance operators, guided by their own standard operating 
procedures, have been using various clearance and survey methods to release suspect 
mined areas. Before the CMAA was set up, there was no formal external quality 
assurance being carried out on demining operators working in country.  
 
After the creation of the CMAA in 2000, the development of national mine action 
standards became a priority for the new regulatory agency; however, with limited 
funding and support, the CMAA took a long time to develop a quality assurance 
capacity. A MAG technical advisor had been deployed with the CMAA in 2002 and in 
2003, to assist with the drafting of the standards based on the IMAS. With the support 
of EC and UNDP, the technical advisor developed a first set of five standards by mid-
2003. Those standards were finally approved in August 2005 and issued in January 
200668.  
 
In 2006, UNDP contracted the private company BACTEC to act as a quality 'agent', to 
assist CMAA in establishing a quality assurance department, monitoring teams and 
accreditation procedures, as well as to assist with the development of Cambodian Mine 
Action Standards (CMAS). BACTEC provided assistance to CMAA from 2006 to 2009, and 
assisted in developing nine new standards. The approval procedure is long and rigid; 
each standard takes approximately one year to be approved before being submitted to 
the Prime Minister and issued through the promulgation of a formal decree. So far, 13 
CMAS have been approved, with the most recent being the baseline survey and mine 
and UXO hazard marking. There are still 11 draft standards waiting to be approved; they 
are currently being reviewed by the operators before being translated to the Khmer 
language.  
 
With BACTEC support, the CMAA deployed its two first quality assurance teams in early 
2008; there are now six quality assurance teams in operation. The responsibility of the 
teams is to monitor compliance to CMAC by demining operators. The teams operate 
form their provincial base and, at current capacity, this results in one quality assurance 
monitoring visit per clearance site per month. Their capacity is probably overstretched, 
given the geographic spread of operators, and it was recommended to increase their 
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number to at least ten teams.  
 
The MTE C4R reported that they had the opportunity to visit the provincial base, which 
was considered very professional, with well-trained staff. The monitoring process was 
reportedly diligent, and the understanding of safety requirements by the team was of 
an acceptable standard.  
 
CMAA does not provide quality assurance coverage to the mine action operations 
implemented by RCAF. So far, only one RCAF platoon has been accredited by CMAA, and 
it is believed that RCAF does not operate according to IMAS and CMAS. From January to 
July 2010, the CMAA database reported substantial outputs cleared by RCAF (25 km²) 
and none of these areas have been subject to quality assurance by the CMAA. Although 
the CMAA has been given the mandate to monitor all mine action activities in the 
country, the authority of the agency has not been exercised over the military.  
 
MINE RISK EDUCATION (MRE) 
Mine risk education (MRE) has been implemented in Cambodia since 1993, with the aim 
of encouraging people to adopt mine/UXO risk avoidance behaviours, to prevent 
landmines and UXO accidents. As Cambodia has progressed along the 'conflict – post 
conflict – reconstruction and development' continuum, both the direct and indirect 
causes for mine/ERW injury have changed69 and risk education techniques have been 
adapted accordingly.  
 
At the end of the nineties, a key priority for rural communities was access to land and, 
as a result, 'informal' demining became widespread and a frequent cause of mine injury. 
More recently, it was reported that informal demining and deliberate tampering, while 
continuing in some areas, are more localised and less prevalent. While intentional 
handling of UXO, especially among adolescent males, is still reported as an issue, 
involuntary contact through routine livelihood activities is still one of the main reasons 
for accidents. Indirect causes of accidents are increasingly recognised as a result of 
livelihood issues, and there is a general consensus that lack of awareness is no longer a 
major determinant of injuries.  
 
Therefore, MRE developed its capacity to interact with mine-affected communities 
through the provision of mine action responses, victim assistance and community 
development programmes, as well disseminating mine risk education messages that 
promote safe behaviour to populations at risk. 
 
Since 2000, mine risk education is coordinated by the MRE unit of the CMAA, and 
implemented through both government and non-government service providers. The 
following organisations have been active in MRE since the start of the mine action 
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programme: 
 
• CMAC 
• the Cambodian Red Cross 
• CARE 
• HALO Trust 
• Handicap International Belgium 
• MAG 
• World Vision 
• Spirit of Soccer 
• National Police70  
• the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports  
 
CRC has been active since the early eighties; UNICEF started to support MRE activities in 
1994 and provided a total of USD 7,667,000 to the sector so far
71
. A mine risk education 
strategic plan was developed in 2006 by the CMAA.  
 
In 2010, MRE is fully integrated in the NMAS, and remains an important component of 
the programme to reduce the incidence of casualties72.  
 
VICTIM ASSISTANCE 
Victim surveillance is part of the victim assistance component of the mine action sector 
and represents a crucial source of information for planning purposes. The Cambodian 
Mine/ERW victim information system (CMVIS) was developed by the Cambodian Red 
Cross in 1994, with the support of Handicap International. CMVIS trained and deployed 
a nationwide surveillance network of CRC volunteers to collect and report detailed 
information related to mine casualties and mine/ERW incidents. The information is 
subsequently disseminated to all stakeholders, and provides a rapid update of casualty 
trends to facilitate the planning of clearance activities. CMVIS had been located and 
operated at the CRC before to be handed over to CMAA at the end of 2009. 
Government (80 per cent) and UNICEF (20 per cent) funding has been provided to 
continue the activity.  
 
The CMAA was initially mandated to coordinate and monitor assistance to landmines 
and UXO victims in Cambodia. However, responsibility for victim assistance was then 
delegated by sub-decree in 2001 to the Ministry of Social Affairs, Veterans and Youth 
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Rehabilitation (MoSVY) and the Disability Action Council (DAC), which was reaffirmed by 
a second sub-decree in 200573. 
 
MoSVY is the key ministry responsible for disability and rehabilitation issues in 
Cambodia. Coordination of the sector is made through the National Disability 
Coordination Committee (NDCC), which also encompasses landmines victims' 
assistance. The NDCC is chaired by the Minister of Social Affairs, Veterans and Youth 
Rehabilitation and the DAC operates as the secretariat of the committee. The MoSVY is 
responsible for disability issues in general, favouring a mainstreamed approach to victim 
assistance that is coherent with the Cartagena Action Plan provisions related to victim 
assistance74.  
 
Because of its considerable number of mine victims, Cambodia is included in the VA26 
group75. In November 2008, the RGC adopted the national plan of action for persons 
with disabilities, including landmine/ERW survivors (NPA-PWD), which articulates the 
RGC responses to the needs of all persons with disabilities . In July 2009, the national 
assembly adopted the law on the protection and the promotion of the rights of persons 
with disabilities. The law is said to be consistent with the dispositions of the convention 
on the rights for people with disabilities76, which was signed by Cambodia in October 
200777.   
 
There are currently 11 rehabilitation centres providing orthopaedic, physiotherapy and 
rehabilitation services to disabled people in Cambodia78. Those facilities are supported 
by five international organisations:  
 
• ICRC, 
• HIB, 
• HIF, 
• Cambodia Trust, and  
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• Veteran International (VI).  
 
The eventual takeover of those rehabilitation facilities by the RGC remains a sensitive 
issue for the MoSVY. The international organisations and the Ministry have signed an 
agreement to arrange for the handover to take place at the end of 2010, however, it is 
likely that the agreement will have to be extended79. The agreement plans for a gradual 
increase of the government financial contribution to the structures, and for 
transforming the local staff to government officers
80
. However, the sustainability of 
some of those rehabilitation facilities is questioned as it is unlikely that the RGC will 
have the capacity to maintain all the rehabilitation centres in operation.  
 
The Landmine Survivor Assistance Program is funded by AusAID and managed by 
Australian Red Cross (ARC). The program started in 2007 and was enlarged in 2010 to 
become the Cambodia Initiative for Disability Inclusion (CIDI).  
 
UNICEF has supported the development of the NPA, the law and the sub-decrees; 
verification has ensured that national legislation is consistent with the UN CRPD. Since 
2006, UNICEF has supported the national community-based rehabilitation (CBR) 
coordination mechanism project to facilitate the development of CBR activities at 
national level, and promote effective services provision and social welfare for people 
with disability in the community.  
 
While services for landmine/ERW survivors have been integrated into the NPA-PWD, 
mine action stakeholders will continue to support MoSVY and the broader disability 
assistance community to guarantee the provision of services tailored to the specific 
needs of the survivors81 through: 
 
• enhanced data collection, 
• advocacy, and  
• resource mobilisation efforts. 
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HISTORY OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT TO THE MINE ACTION 
PROGRAMME 
TYPE AND EXTENT OF SUPPORT 
UNITED NATIONS 
The mine action programme in Cambodia was initially mandated by the UNAMIC and 
UNTAC, which trained Cambodian nationals to detect and destroy landmines, through 
the setting up of training centres. Essentially, all the deminers who started operating in 
the country in the beginning of the nineties had been trained during the UNTAC period. 
When CMAC was established in 1992, a large part of the demining capacity was 
gradually absorbed.  
 
From the end of 1993, UNDP and UNOPS developed several phases of a project known 
as 'Assistance to Demining Programmes'82. The objectives of this project were:  
 
  that donor’s financial contributions  would cover CMAC operations, in line with 
the official mandate of the organisation, 
 to channel donor’s in-kind contributions of specialised military personnel to 
provide technical assistance to CMAC, and 
 to support institutional building in areas of leadership, planning, administration 
and financial management, through UNDP technical advisors  
 
For many donors, the UNDP Trust Fund (TF) has been the primary choice to channel 
financial resources to CMAC for reasons of simplicity, transparency and accountability. 
However, the use of the TF may have created a perception within CMAC that the 
funding would be everlasting83. Between 1993 and 2000, it was reported that a total of 
USD 63 million had been transferred to CMAC through the UNDP/UNOPS Trust Fund, 
not including the government contribution of 1.76 million to CMAC and CMAA
84
. 
 
From 2001 until 2005, UNDP implemented a Support to Mine Action Programmes in 
Cambodia project, which aimed at: 
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• continuing the provision of financial and technical support to CMAC and the 
CMAA  
• developing national ownership and decision-making 
 
The project continued to channel pool funding to the sector and provide training 
opportunities through the Mine Action Exchange programme and the senior mine 
action management course, offered by the James Madison and Cranfield Universities. 
 
Since 2006, UNDP has supported the Clearing for Results: A partnership for mine action 
in Cambodia (C4R) project, with the aim of supporting the RGC’s response to its mine 
problem by developing the CMAA capacity to lead, coordinate, monitor and regulate 
the sector, and by funding clearance in support of poverty alleviation and rural 
development activities.  
 
Between 2006 and 2009, in partnership with CMAC, more than 30 km² were also 
cleared. The project assisted CMAA to: 
 
• revise the operational guidelines on the socio-economic management of mine 
clearance operations  
• establish a post-clearance land-use monitoring system 
 
CMAA has developed its capacity in the regulation and monitoring of demining and 
survey activities, by developing Cambodian Mine Action Standards and accreditation 
mechanisms, and by deploying six quality assistance teams. Between 2006 and 2009, 
Clearing for Results has mobilised some USD 25 million mainly from AusAID, CIDA, 
Spain, Adopt  a Minefield and UNDP core resources85.   
 
Recently, Cambodian officials expressed the wish to develop to a more balanced 
partnership with UNDP, to allow the CMAA to assume a more 'determinative role' in 
managing the next phase of the C4R project (2011-2015)
86
. The direct implementation 
modality was abandoned in favour of the national implementation modality. 
Consequently, the chair of the TWG-MA is expected to play a more active role in the 
management of the project and in the approval of the operational work plan.  
 
The number of UNDP advisors should be reduced from two to one by the end of 201287. 
The CMAA wishes to test the organisation's ability to manage key planning and 
regulatory functions 'in its own right', believing that playing a stronger role in the 
conduct of the project will reinforce the capacity of the agency to convene donors and 
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national actors to push forward the aid-effectiveness agenda. The CMAA proposed to 
have one single chair of the project executive group, 'ideally the CMAA'88.  
 
As the sector is appropriately going into the direction of a programme-based approach, 
this is a positive development, as the sector becomes more mature and the national 
execution management modality is considered the norm by UNDP.  
 
In compliance with its mandate in the mine action sector, UNICEF has been active in 
providing technical and financial assistance to the mine risk education (MRE) sector. 
UNICEF supported the coordination among the different operators and the 
development of the community-based mine risk reduction project, and, recently, 
funded the: 
 
• MRE sector evaluation  
• elaboration of the MRE strategy  
 
 
Traditionally, UNICEF also supports the victim assistance component of mine action 
programmes, for example: 
 
• financial assistance to ensure the smooth handover of CMVIS from CRC to CMAA  
• assistance to provide MoSVY to develop the disability law and issue the 
application sub-decrees  
 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
The European Commission (EC) has supported several operations in the mine action 
sector in Cambodia through CMAC, and 'independent' operators, such as HALO Trust, 
MAG, HIB and CIDEV. In February 1998, the EC launched the Institutional Strengthening 
of the Cambodian Mine Action Centre project, which, through the provision of technical 
advisors, aimed at: 
 
• improving the coordination between CMAC and the other demining operators  
• providing institutional support and capacity-building to CMAC in the EOD, socio-
economic and verification departments of the organisation  
 
Within CMAC, one of the major outputs was the creation of a socio-economic unit that 
was involved in the setting up of the LUPU prioritisation mechanism and the creation of 
a regulatory body for the mine action sector (the Cambodian Demining Regulatory 
Authority - CDRA) within CMAC Governing Council. The CDRA was set up to coordinate, 
regulate and monitor mine action activities on behalf of the RGC. CDRA responsibilities 
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were taken over by CMAA. From January 2002 until June 2003, the EC continued to 
provide financial and technical assistance to assist the establishment of the CMAA. 
 
The European Commission has also developed the Economic and Social Re-launch of 
Northwest Provinces (ECOSORN). This five-year project ends at the end of 2010 and 
includes a funding facility for mine action activities to be implemented in the target 
zone by CMAC.  
THE GENEVA INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR HUMANITARIAN DEMINING 
The GICHD provides support to CMAC, the CMAA and other mine action actors in 
Cambodia in the fields of strategic management, operations, and information 
management. The minister attached to the Prime Minister and Vice-chair of CMAA, HE 
Prak Sokhonn, is a member of the Council of Foundation and HE Heng Rattana, Director 
General of CMAC, is a member of the advisory board. HE Sophakmonkol Prum, Deputy 
Secretary General of CMAA, is a member of the International Mine Action Standards 
Review Board. 
 
The GICHD has assisted the CMAA to prepare the strategic planning process leading to 
the adoption of the National Mine Action Strategy. The Centre also assisted the 
midterm evaluation of the UNDP C4R project in 1998.  
 
In the frame of 'Linking Mine Action and Development' (LMAD), GICHD and Cambodian 
mine action and development agencies organised a workshop in Siem Reap in June 
2007.  
 
The Implementation Support Unit (ISU) has provided some assistance in relation to the 
preparation of the Cambodian Article 5 Extension Request. 
 
Over the last two years, the GICHD provided assistance to CMAC in: 
 
• developing land release operational methodologies 
• efficiently deploying mine detection dogs  
• organising a mechanical demining workshop 
 
The CMAA has also requested assistance to receive and install the new generation 
Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). 
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS 
A large number of Non-governmental Organisations have supported CMAC and the 
mine action programme in Cambodia, through providing technical and financial 
assistance.  
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Handicap International 
Contracted by UNDP, Handicap International (HI) provided several technical advisors to 
CMAC headquarters and the three regional demining units in finance, administration 
and logistics, contributing to the development of CMAC internal procedures. HI 
supported the creation of the demining unit N°4 in Kompong Thom in 1996 with a grant 
from the European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO).  
 
The organisation has been directly involved in the establishment and the development 
of the: 
 
• LUPU system 
•  CMAC CBMRR approach  
• setting up of CMVIS with CRC 
 
HI has been very active in the disability sector, and was instrumental in developing and 
supporting the physiotherapy school training curriculum in Phnom Penh. It has 
managed several regional rehabilitation centres in cooperation with the Ministry of 
Social Affairs and provided support to the Disability Action Council, to reinforce 
coordination between MoSVY and the service providers active in the disability sector. 
Norwegian People’s Aid 
After having handed over the control of demining operations to CMAC in 1994, 
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) continued to support CMAC, by providing technical 
assistance and training in areas such as quality control, planning, demining unit 
management, mine awareness, public relations and operations89.  
 
To improve integration of clearance operations in development activities, NPA launched 
the Resettlement, Community Integration and Rehabilitation project in 1996. NPA has 
been innovative in supporting new approaches to increase the productivity and the 
efficiency of CMAC, through contributing to the risk reduction concept and in 
developing the technical survey model. NPA supported the setting up of a quality 
management system (ISO 9000) and currently provides technical assistance to the 
CMAA database.  NPA was also instrumental in setting up a functional and working 
CMAA database; all current staff are trained by NPA and NPA is fully funding the DBU’s 
running costs. 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
During the inception phase of the programme, technical assistance was provided in the 
frame of UNTAC, and contributing countries seconded military advisors to the MCTU. It 
is reported that, at one point, 130 military advisors were deployed, most of them 
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rotated every six months; too short to be knowledgeable about Cambodia and its 
culture90.  
 
In addition, the short term of UNTAC mandate (18 months) did not facilitate 
management training, resource mobilisation strategies, or the development of a 
national programme. After UNDP set up the trust fund and started the Assistance to 
Demining Programmes projects, an increased number of civilian technical advisors were 
deployed in CMAC.  
 
The UNDP Phase III project planned to have seven UNDP technical advisors and 61 other 
positions provided by ten other donors and two UN agencies. In June 1999, a total of at 
least 78 permanent international technical advisors were recorded as working for the 
organisation91. It was estimated that the annual cost of the technical assistance 
provided to the sector was between USD 7.5 million and USD 13 million, representing 
sometimes the same amount of funding that had been channelled to CMAC operations.  
 
Besides UNDP and UNOPS, major technical assistance providers included Canada, 
Australia, Belgium, France, New Zealand, Finland, HI, NPA and Sweden.  
 
The functional and cost-effectiveness analysis of this general capacity development 
exercise for the period until 2000 remains mixed92: 
  
 Technical assistance initiatives were mostly donor driven. Technical advisors 
rotated to their government schedule, often for only six months at a time, 
consulting with CMAC only minimally on proposed replacements or target 
objectives of the exercise. Short term assignments did not facilitate their 
eventual adaptation to the Cambodian culture and 'attitude' problems were 
often reported, creating misunderstandings and frustration about the role of 
technical assistance. 
 
 Although the number of civilian technical advisors gradually increased, there was 
a continued and persistent tradition of using military advisors with little 
development background, who despite having high professional technical skills, 
lacked somewhat in training and teaching skills. Incidentally, their presence 
instilled a pervasive military culture in the organisation, preventing CMAC from 
linking effectively with civil society, development organisations or other 
ministries. In fact, several attempts were made by TA’s to have CMAC change 
focus but the CMAC top management insisted on having it this way. This 
insistence on drill and technical training may have been detrimental to the 
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strengthening of other equally essential management functions such as finance, 
human resources and planning.  
 
 The initial and traditional capacity-development delivery method was done in a 
one to one way, with one advisor dedicated to one national counterpart. The 
system was considered by CMAC management as inefficient to create a 
sustainable capacity-development environment. Using a roving or horizontal 
approach would have reached a wider audience and maximised the impact of 
the intervention. As a result of this system, technical advisors often became 
directly involved in operational issues instead of supporting national 
counterparts. In some other cases, they were even asked to do the job instead of 
being seen as advisors.  
 
 The proliferation of international advisors seconded by a large number of donors 
and organisations, with sometimes vague or non-adapted terms of reference, 
did not facilitate the coordination of the different inputs by CMAC and the UNDP 
coordinator. There was a lack of continuity and coherence between successive 
technical advisors. Furthermore, they had also developed a large set of manuals 
and procedures in English that could not be shared with their national colleagues 
or with middle management. As a result, many could not contribute to the 
strengthening of the institution. 
 
The crisis that hit CMAC in 1999 and 2000 forced a change of perspective in capacity 
development delivery methods. The large international technical advisor contingent had 
been seen by CMAC management as unable to prevent the crisis and ineffective to take 
corrective measures. On the contrary, the solution seemed to originate in an increased 
national leadership of the programme and, as a result, the necessity to own and control 
the process of designing, selecting, managing and monitoring all technical assistance 
appeared more evident to CMAC.  
 
In the preparation of the next phase of the project, the number of foreign technical 
advisors was significantly phased down, and their professional skills were more carefully 
scrutinised. The new project gave the CMAC Director General the capacity to make 
decisions at all stages in regard to the need to initiate or continue capacity development 
inputs, including the preparation of terms of reference, monitoring of the progress and 
coordination of the inputs from the various partners. The old technical advisors 
structure was abandoned and it was suggested to adopt a more flexible, efficient and 
streamlined mechanism that would mix the presence of long term civilian expert 
advisors with other professional development solutions. Examples of this included: 
 
• study tours 
• workshops 
• seminars 
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• courses 
• training  
• short consultancies 
 
It was decided to reinforce the use of existing national services and capacities: 
consultant companies were contracted to provide management advisory services to 
CMAC, focusing on internal controls and human resources development. Training needs 
assessments were carried out, and a staff training and development programme was 
developed and implemented as part of the integrated working plan. 
 
The crisis created an electroshock for the RGC, CMAC and the donors. The reputation of 
the organisation was in jeopardy and the donor confidence at the lowest. A large 
number of management staff was demoted, resigned or moved to other services. To 
ensure its survival, the organisation had to reform radically, and the CMAC management 
took control of this process. The crisis facilitated the understanding that the on-going 
technical assistance system had reached its limits and had to be seriously re-examined. 
The principle of national execution was reemphasised, and CMAC ownership of its 
technical assistance re-established. The crisis prompted the RGC to get more involved 
with CMAC and to reorganise the institutional framework of the mine action sector in 
Cambodia, by creating the CMAA and reviewing CMAC mandate, freeing it to 
concentrate on its core functions.  
 
In parallel, issues related to national ownership and leadership of the development 
agenda and process were highlighted in new cooperation paradigm that was presented 
by the RGC to development partners during the Consultative Group meeting in May 
2000. This new thinking – with the increased importance of the national aid 
effectiveness agenda – would now substantially influence the way the mine action 
sector would be managed and the programme operated. As indicated in the mine action 
strategy, the creation of the CMAA was the product of the new mindset among 
Cambodian leaders, and the national regulating agency was seen as symbol of an 
increased national ownership and leadership of the mine action sector
93
.  
 
The EC94 and the UNDP supported the first steps of the CMAA establishment. The first 
years of operations were complicated, partly due to a lack of confidence by donors and, 
consequently, little external assistance had been channelled to the CMAA.  
 
Gradually, more technical and financial assistance was provided to the database by 
Germany and Canada. United Kingdom assistance was channelled through UNDP, to 
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develop socio-economic planning and quality management. In the C4R project, more 
substantive support was provided to CMAA to develop management capacities, 
consolidate the authority of the agency and strengthen mine action policies and 
standards and enhance the prioritisation and planning system. The UNDP capacity 
development team is composed of a project coordinator, a technical advisor in socio-
economics and a technical advisor in quality management
95
. In the C4R phase two, the 
number of advisors should be reduced to two and then one by 2012. The CMAA 
capacity development plan was finalised in August 201196. 
 
Despite some above mentioned limitations, the long effort of developing capacity of the 
Cambodian mine action sector definitely brought positive results.  
 
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE 
Cambodia has benefited greatly from significant contributions from the international 
community to fund mine action activities since 1992. The overwhelming majority of 
mine action funding has been directed to mine clearance, but significant contributions 
have also been made to MRE, victim assistance, mine action governance, integrated 
mine action programmes and research and development. While Cambodia remains a 
developing country with great pressure on its national budget to address a wide range 
of different needs, the RGC, in recent years, managed to increase its budget allocation 
to mine action.  
 
Development Partners contributed to all the components of the mine action 
programme, plus in-kind donations such as metal detectors, vehicles, information 
technology (IT) equipment, mine detection dogs (MDD) and demining machines. Total 
documented contributions are USD 267,836,89597 for the period 1993-2009. The three 
operators (CMAC, HALO Trust and MAG) received financial contributions from donors of 
at least USD 244,393,63598 from 1993-2009.  
 
The RGC provided USD 2,945,136 support to CMAC from 1994 to 2009 and USD 
8,902,976 in core support for CMAA, RCAF and the police, from 2003 to 2009. In 
addition, the MoEF, over the period 2000-2007, provided over USD 38,541,865 to 
finance demining support for infrastructure reconstruction projects, giving a total 
estimated RGC contribution of approximately USD 50 million from 1994 to 200999. 
Other Cambodian contributions, particularly by local authorities and community 
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members, gave valuable contributions to the successful execution of the mine action 
programme over the last 18 years.  
 
EXISTENCE AND CONTENT OF CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT PLANS 
After 17 years of operations and the provision of massive capacity development and 
technical assistance for more than ten years, CMAC is happy to declare that the 
organisation does not need substantial capacity development anymore100. CMAC 
currently benefits from assistance from JICA, which deployed three experts in 
information management, maintenance of equipment and capacity development of the 
training centre; NPA, which provided an MDD TA; and Germany, which funded a TA with 
DU6. This phase of the project will stop in September 2010. The continuation of this 
activity will depend on an eventual new request for assistance from CMAC. 
 
Regarding CMAA, the assessment is different. The C4R Review (December 2009) noted 
that CMAA was still in need of capacity development and institutional strengthening. 
The CMAA is currently in the process of assessing its future capacity development 
needs.  The C4R review reported that the provision of technical assistance via 
embedded and dedicated personnel – whether full time technical advisors or long term 
specialist consultants – was the best indicated modality for supporting capacity 
development within the agency. The review recommended continuing with this 
modality during the next phase of the project (2011-2015). 
 
The CMAA and UNDP are in the process of assessing the future needs of capacity 
development in the organisation101. Without pre-empting the results of this exercise, 
the C4R review proposed nevertheless the following recommendations related to 
capacity development: 
 
 the CMAA database is currently supported by NPA; it is recommended to 
reinforce that assistance to enhance the capacity of the database to provide 
comprehensive information services to the government, development partners 
and mine action organisations 
 the CMAA quality assurance teams performances should be evaluated to assess 
future capacity needs, 
 the CMAA socio-economic and planning department should be reinforced 
through the provision of long term consultants 
 South-south cooperation should be further developed 
 
Although it is accurate to declare that the mine and ERW problem will continue for a 
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long time in Cambodia102, it is considered that a large part of this problem – the part 
that actually affects people's life – can in fact be resolved in a reasonable period of time.  
 
With appropriate support, it is believed that the National Mine Action Strategy 
constitutes a realistic and credible road map toward a situation where the landmine and 
ERW contamination will have a gradually negligible negative impact on Cambodian 
citizens. According to the strategy, Cambodia aims to be mine/ERW impact free within 
the next ten years (2019). In order to address the longer term requirements in solving 
the mine and ERW contamination problem, the RGC will engage key national players 
(CMAC, RCAF and Police) to ensure that viable and sustainable institutions are in place 
after 2019. 
 
Taking into account the strategic objectives, the remaining capacity development efforts 
to be implemented in the Cambodian mine action sector should be appreciated from 
this medium term perspective. All mine action professionals believed that most of the 
problem should be solved by 2019 if the programme is correctly funded and well 
managed. However, the current priority should be to assist Cambodia to sustain 
ongoing efforts during the next ten years, at a level that will allow the accomplishment 
of the national mine action strategy objectives.  
 
With the national ownership and leadership of the programme now well affirmed, 
development partners should remain confident it is possible to achieve concrete and 
substantive results in the next ten years for the following reasons: 
 
 While it had often been said that mine action in Cambodia would last several 
hundred years, we have now to recognise that the threat is much more 
manageable than initially thought, and can be quickly reduced to an acceptable 
level. Unlike other development problems, the clearance of mine/ERW affected 
areas solves the problem: it will not come back again. 
 The Cambodian mine action programme has undoubtedly been through some 
challenging periods. The current institutional and operational conditions are 
however considered to be favourable for the future. It is important that they 
receive the encouragement an support they need.  
 Mine action remains essential for development and poverty reduction; mine 
action is an investment, not a cost, it creates economic opportunity and reduces 
health and security cost. 
 Support to mine action is a moral imperative towards poverty-stricken 
Cambodians living in affected areas. 
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TRANSITION TO NATIONAL OWNERSHIP 
TRANSITION PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION 
Today, the structure of the mine action programme is clearly defined and it is 
reasonable to assert that national ownership by Cambodian authorities of the mine 
action programme is now firmly established because of and thanks to the following:  
 
 the presence of a large, efficient and competent national mine action 
organisation as CMAC 
 the establishment of the CMAA, acting as a regulator on behalf of the 
government, and coordinating the assistance made by all partners involved in 
the programme, especially the essential contributions made by CMAC, HALO and 
MAG to demining activities 
 the setting up of the TWG-MA facilitating policy dialogue, and partnerships 
between the RGC and development partners103  
 
However, this does not mean that there is no room for improvement; in terms of 
progressing towards a programme-based approach and reinforcing aid effectiveness in 
the sector, the following issues have been identified104:  
 
 There are still a number of projects supported by different development 
partners which are independently managed and implemented. These include 
projects on MRE, demining, and integrated demining and development projects. 
Demining activities funded by the RGC in support of infrastructure projects are 
not recorded for the mine action sector in the ODA database105.  
 Some mine action operators do not have complete records of the funding they 
received. Some development partners do not have complete records of their 
mine action contributions. The mine action sector does not have a mechanism to 
record financial and in-kind contributions, and the CMAA Secretariat General 
does not have a clear mechanism to confirm financial contributions from the 
MoEF for demining activities. 
 
The formulation of the NMAS has been a constructive process and the strategy is in 
itself an important asset for enhancing national ownership and the aid effectiveness 
agenda. However, some gaps remain: 
 
 The absence of complete and accurate records on the extent and nature of 
the contamination still hampers operational planning and prioritisation. 
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Missing information should be made available by the end of 2012, with the 
completion of the baseline survey.  
 Complete and accurate records of RCAF demining achievements are still not 
available106. 
 The database unit in CMAA needs continued reinforcement, if the data are to 
be analysed and reported in a timely and useful way. 
 The coordination with a number of government agencies and ministries 
facing mine/UXO contamination problems could be improved. CMAA can 
provide assistance but lacks a coordination capacity with relevant 
government bodies (for example, ministries in charge of infrastructure, 
agriculture and rural development)107. 
 Reporting at the output level is reasonably accurate, but little reporting 
exists at the outcomes level. CMAA still has to develop its monitoring and 
evaluation system. Some initiatives (such as the UNDP supported Impact 
Assessment methodology development) are underway to strengthen this 
function.  
 
The TWG-MA will play a crucial role if the goals and strategic objectives of the NMAS are 
to be achieved. In particular, the TWG-MA should focus on policy dialogue and 
partnerships expansion with mine action development partners, as there is no other 
mechanism to fulfil this role.  
 
NMAS, together with Partnership Principles, the Planning and Prioritisation Guidelines 
and the Cambodian Mine Action Standards provide a good policy and regulatory 
framework for the mine action sector, but other sectors are unaware of these policies. 
Coordination with ministries and other government agencies can be further developed. 
Mainstreaming mine action within government rehabilitation and socio-economic 
development plans and strategies remains as critical as ever.  
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LESSONS LEARNT 
THE ROLE OF THE UN 
The United Nations (UNTAC, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNMAS) have been pivotal in 
creating the impetus establishing a mine action capacity in Cambodia. Despite the initial 
lack of vision and preparation often underlined in the documentation and the strong 
military and organisational mindset, most people questioned during this research 
expressed the feeling that the UN, alongside other organisations as HI and NPA, should 
be 'proud' of what had been done in building national capacities to operate and manage 
a large, complex and comprehensive mine action programme.  
THE USE OF THE TRUST FUND 
The use of a pool funding facility as the UNDP Trust Fund is recognised to decrease 
transaction costs and is appreciated by donors for its transparency and simplicity. The 
application of such a modality is to be encouraged, as the sector is more actively moving 
into a programme-based approach108. However, at the beginning of the programme, the 
trust fund may have generated a diffuse feeling among CMAC staff that it was a never-
ending source of cash with the negative consequence that efficiency and productivity 
were not given enough attention109. For various reasons, some donors prefer to 
earmark and channel directly their contributions to mine action operators. To ensure 
the requirements of the various donors are accommodated and in order to enlarge the 
partnerships possibilities, CMAC and other organisations have usefully developed their 
management and reporting capacities.  
THE CRISIS AND CMAC REFORM 
The 1999-2000 crisis undoubtedly constituted an electric shock treatment for the RGC, 
CMAC and the donors. To regain confidence from donors, CMAC had to engage in a very 
structured and robust reform process that enhanced its operational capacity and 
productivity and significantly improved the quality of its management. The crisis 
prompted the RGC to restructure the institutional framework of the mine action sector 
in Cambodia, by creating the CMAA and reviewing CMAC mandate, allowing to 
organisation to concentrate on its core functions.  
THE CRISIS AND THE CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
The crisis facilitated the understanding that the existing technical assistance system had 
reached its limits and had to be seriously re-examined. The way capacity development 
and technical assistance were provided to CMAC and the mine action sector was 
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radically modified. The old technical advisor structure was eliminated and there was a 
shift from military to civilian technical advisors with development experience. This 
encouraged Cambodian ownership, the principle of national execution was 
reemphasised, and CMAC ownership of its technical assistance re-established. Capacity 
development has been at the heart of the efforts made by the organisation during the 
post-crisis period and, thanks to those efforts, CMAC can now be described as a 
stronger, more efficient and better managed mine action organisation.  
THE CMAA 
Despite being consistent with best internationally recognised practices, the creation of 
the CMAA as a national agency responsible for regulating and coordinating mine action 
in Cambodia was not fully understood in 2000. It is now accepted that separating the 
regulator – acting on behalf of the government – and service providers is a sound, valid 
and necessary move. The establishment of this agency consolidated the national 
ownership in giving the RGC the capacity to lead the programme according to its 
priorities and strategies. There is still room for improvement in the way the agency 
operates, but progress has been observed. An efficient CMAA will be an asset to achieve 
the goals and objectives articulated in the national mine action strategy.  
 
THE PBA 
The adoption of a programme-based approach (PBA) by the Cambodian mine action 
sector has given an unquestionable leadership position to the RGC in leading the 
programme, and is considered crucial in guaranteeing the continued enhancement of 
operational efficiency in the sector. The application of the Harmonisation, Alignment 
and Results Action Plan and the relevant joint monitoring indicators by all stakeholders 
is essential to the successful implementation of the NMAS. The TWG-MA ensures policy 
dialogue, encourages the development of new partnerships, and harmonises activities 
and projects to avoid redundancy and resources duplication.  
TOWARDS THE END OF THE PROGRAMME 
Although not always smooth and easy, the long capacity development exercise has been 
considered fruitful and decisive in the progresses made by the mine action programme 
in this country. However, in regards to demining objectives and plans, massive clearance 
operations are not sustainable. Consideration should be given by development partners 
to channel an appropriate level of financial and technical resources to ensure that 
Cambodia complies with international obligations related to landmines to achieve the 
goals and objectives articulated in the national strategy. To reach such a situation, 
Cambodia must preserve robust clearance capacity and services among its professional 
operators, and ensure the strengthening of its prioritisation (MAPA) and quality 
assurance mechanisms. The long term residual landmines and ERW contamination will 
be addressed by national operators as RCAF and the police with national resources.  
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VICTIM ASSISTANCE  
Progress has been observed in the development the National Plan of Action for People 
with Disabilities (NPA-PWD), the adoption of the law protecting PWD and some of the 
relevant subdecrees. Cambodia is actively preparing to ratify the UN Convention on the 
rights of PWD. However, observers underlined the lack of support to the MoSVY in the 
implementation of those measures and plans; it was also noted that the handover of 
the 11 rehabilitation facilities currently operated with the assistance of five 
international NGOs was threatened by a lack of funding from the RGC.  
ADVOCACY 
In support to peace and security efforts worldwide and in the region, the national mine 
action strategy indicates that the RGC will join as soon possible other disarmament 
instruments, such as the CCW Protocol V related to ERW. In the 'Rectangular Strategy' 
and the NMAS, Cambodia confirms its willingness to contribute positively to regional 
integration, peace and security. Cambodia reaffirmed its readiness to closely cooperate 
with its neighbours, in order to engage as soon as possible in the demarcation and 
clearance of the border area. As Cambodia is one of the most UXO-affected countries in 
the world, some development partners recommended Cambodia to sign the Convention 
on Cluster Munition (CCM), as this may open new resources opportunities for the 
programme.  
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ANNEXES 
 
ANNEX 1 
 
Cambodia Political Map 
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ANNEX 2 
 
Location of the Main Anti-PKR Camps 
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ANNEX 3 
 
Cambodia Key Indicators 
           2000 2005 2007 2008
Population, total (millions) 12,76 13,87 14,32 14,56
Population growth (annual %) 2,0 1,6 1,6 1,6
Surface area (sq. km) (thousands) 181,0 181,0 181,0 181,0
Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line (% of population) .. .. 30,1 ..
GNI, Atlas method (current US$) (billions) 3,62 6,20 8,01 9,25
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$) 280 450 560 640
GNI, PPP (current international $) (billions) 11,03 19,35 24,98 27,18
GNI per capita, PPP (current international $) 860 1.400 1.740 1.870
Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 57 59 60 61
Fertility rate, total (births per woman) 3,9 3,1 3,0 2,9
Contraceptive prevalence (% of women ages 15-49) 24 40 .. ..
Births attended by skilled health staff (% of total) 32 44 .. ..
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000) 106 96 91 90
Malnutrition prevalence, weight for age (% of children under 5) 40 .. .. 29
Immunization, measles (% of children ages 12-23 months) 65 79 79 89
Primary completion rate, total (% of relevant age group) 47 85 85 79
Ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary education (%) 82 .. 90 ..
Prevalence of HIV, total (% of population ages 15-49) 1,6 1,0 0,8 ..
Forest area (sq. km) (thousands) 115,4 104,5 100,1 ..
Agricultural land (% of land area) 27,0 30,3 30,9 ..
Improved water source (% of population with access) 38 .. .. ..
Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access) 16 .. .. ..
GDP (current US$) (billions) 3,65 6,29 8,63 10,35
GDP growth (annual %) 8,8 13,3 10,2 6,7
Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) -3,2 6,1 6,5 12,3
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) 38 32 32 35
Industry, value added (% of GDP) 23 26 27 24
Services, etc., value added (% of GDP) 39 41 41 41
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 50 64 65 ..
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) 62 73 73 ..
Gross capital formation (% of GDP) 18 18 21 ..
Revenue, excluding grants (% of GDP) .. 9,7 .. ..
Cash surplus/deficit (% of GDP) .. 0,0 .. ..
Time required to start a business (days) .. 86 86 85
Market capitalization of listed companies (% of GDP) .. .. .. ..
Military expenditure (% of GDP) 2,2 1,1 1,1 ..
Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) 1 8 18 29
Internet users (per 100 people) 0,0 0,3 0,5 0,5
Roads, paved (% of total roads) .. .. .. ..
High-technology exports (% of manufactured exports) 0 .. .. ..
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$) (millions) 149 381 867 815
Net official development assistance and official aid received (current US$) (millions) 396 539 675 743
World view
People
Environment
Economy
States and markets
Global links
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ANNEX 4 
 
Timeline of the Programme 
 
November 1991 UNAMIC deployment 
 
1991-1992  HALO survey in Battambang province 
 
March 1992  UNTAC deployment 
 
June 1992  Official creation of CMAC by SNC 
 
July 1992  Setting up of the MCTU 
 
November 1992 First meeting of CMAC Governing Council 
 
1993   HIB employs the first MCTU graduates and fields the first 
deminers 
   Deployment of NPA, HALO, MAG and COFRAS 
 
May 1993  National elections 
   First FUNCINPEC / CPP coalition government 
 
September 1993 Sihanouk returned as new King 
 
December 1993 UNTAC withdrawal 
   First UNDP / UNOPS Assistance to Demining Programme 
 
February 1995 A Royal Decree established CMAC as a public institution 
   Appointment of a new CMAC Director, first CMAC strategic plan 
 
August 1996  First KR defections (Ieng Sary faction) 
 
July 1997  'Factional fighting' in Phnom Penh 
   Some FUNCINPEC commanders join the KR along the border with 
Thailand 
 
April 1998  Death of Pol Pot 
 
July 1998  National elections – Second CPP / FUNCINPEC coalition 
government 
   Cambodia regains its seat at the UN General Assembly  
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December 1998 Final KR defections 
 
Beginning 1999 First corruption and 'contract demining' allegations 
 
May 1999  KPMG appointed to audit CMAC 
 
August 1999  Sam Sotha is removed from the CMAC Director position 
 
1999   Cambodia is accepted as a member of ASEAN 
 
Mid-2000  Start of the Level 1 Survey 
 
September 2000 Creation of the CMAA 
 
November 2000 National Symposium on mine action 
 
2001   Start of the UNDP Assistance to Mine Action project 
 
February 2002 First commune councils elections 
 
April 2002  Termination of Level 1 Survey 
 
August 2003  CMAA National Mine Action Strategy / Five-Year Mine action Plan 
 
November 2004 Creation of the TWG on mine action 
 
2006   Beginning of UNDP C4R phase 1 project 
 
October 2008  Revision of CMAA Royal Decree 
 
November 2009 MBT SP grant a 10 years extension to comply with Article 5 
obligations 
 
2010   Adoption of a new 2010-2019 National Mine Action Strategy 
 
